The Andersen Air Force Base 1965–66 Radar Wave
Six years after the last report in its earlier 1952–1959 cluster, Andersen Air Force Base in Yigo, Guam produced a different kind of case. From October 1965, civilian FAA controllers working the base’s AN/FPS-20 surveillance radar kept seeing coded IFF (Mode 3) transponder replies with no known source. The 3rd Air Division’s report to Washington, dated 11 July 1966, lists 24 dated occurrences, 16 of them in June 1966. On 23 June a KC-135 and a C-97 tried to intercept one. Early on 28 June (local time), an Air Rescue Squadron C-130 held a return on its APS-59 radar for twenty minutes and flew through it repeatedly without seeing anything. The Foreign Technology Division then concluded that “material (solid) targets are not involved.” Project Blue Book closed the series as “Other (FALSE TARGETS).” This page is built on those documents, which NICAP hosts as a scanned 11-page file.
Bottom line
- Best explanation
- Transponder replies from real aircraft far beyond normal radar range, displayed at false, shorter ranges, plus atmospheric ducting: the explanation of the Air Force’s electronics analysts, adopted by Project Blue Book. It fits the strongest facts in the record but was never tied to specific flights.
- Why “Disputed”
- The records are genuine and detailed, but they document a radar phenomenon, not an object: every return was a coded transponder reply, and three intercept attempts found nothing. Still unexplained: whose transponder was replying, and why it appeared where nothing was.
- What would change it
- Tying the replies to specific flights, which the Air Force’s analysts said the data did not allow. The record does not say whether a 19 June return that seemed to come from a surface vessel was followed up.
Pictured: a U.S. Air Force Bendix AN/FPS-20 early-warning/ground-controlled-interception radar of the same type identified in NICAP's Blue Book-sourced documentation as one of the two ground radar systems (alongside an AN/FPS-6 height-finder) that tracked the unidentified target during this case's June 28, 1966 culminating event. This is not a photograph of the specific FPS-20 unit stationed on Guam in 1965–66, nor of Andersen AFB itself; no rights-clear photograph of Guam's own period installation, or of any radar scope image from this specific wave, is known to survive. It is an official, public-domain U.S. Air Force photograph of the identical radar model, sourced from David F. Winkler's Cold War radar history Searching the Skies.
Theoretical Alignment
The record leans hard against an exotic reading. All 24 occurrences were coded IFF Mode 3 transponder replies. A transponder reply is a signal sent back by equipment that has been interrogated; it is not an echo from a body. The Air Force’s own electronics analysts concluded that solid targets were not involved and proposed returns from real aircraft displaced by multiple-time-around and ducting effects. The ETH weighting therefore rests only on the fact that the 3rd Air Division itself could not explain the returns, and that no one ever traced the transmitter. The Psycho-Social Hypothesis has little purchase on a phenomenon recorded by instruments as coded beacon replies. The Interdimensional Hypothesis has no specific support in the record and is included only for this site’s standard comparative framework.
Background
Andersen Air Force Base, on the northern tip of Guam in the village of Yigo, already had a history of UFO reports when this series began. An earlier 1952–1959 cluster, including a fighter pursuit by 1st Lt. Ted Brunson, is covered in this site’s separate Andersen Air Force Base UFO Sightings case file. That cluster rested on visual observation. The 1965–66 series is the reverse: it is almost entirely a radar record, and nobody ever saw an object.
The background is Operation Arc Light. B-52s flew their first Vietnam mission from Andersen on 18 June 1965, and the base became the campaign’s main bomber base; Arc Light ran until August 1973. Air traffic around Guam grew sharply, and the 3rd Air Division at Andersen controlled the bomber force. The air division’s report says that at first the beacon returns seemed to correlate with Arc Light launches and recoveries, “but this has been disproved.” It also records one other unusual condition at the time: the Soviet trawler Izmeritel was “maintaining station off the coast of Guam.”
Two ground radars appear in the record. The AN/FPS-20 was an L-band long-range search radar. Guam’s set was operated by Federal Aviation Administration controllers, and the report gives the address of the Guam CERAP (Center/Radar Approach Control) at Agana. The AN/FPS-6 was an S-band height-finder, used to add altitude to a search radar’s track. According to the report, the FPS-20 was used “in all cases” and the FPS-6 “when available.” The returns that made this a UFO case were not ordinary radar echoes. They were secondary-radar returns: coded replies from an IFF/SIF transponder answering the ground station’s interrogation, displayed “as beacon IFF mode three with various codes.”
Andersen also has at least one report between the 1952–1959 cluster and this series. On 25 September 1961, a Project 10073 record card (digitized by UFOScans.com) logs two brief sightings at about 10:45Z. One was an orange “cylindrical mass of flame” seen by a senior master sergeant. The other was a similar “grapefruit”-sized object seen by Air Intelligence Officer Capt. Edward J. Pilecki and placed about 25 miles north of Anatahan Island. Pilecki was “adamant” that it was not a natural phenomenon, but the case was filed “MAY BE METEOR.” It involved no radar and has no connection to the 1965–66 returns.
Complete Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jun 18, 1965 | B-52s fly the first Arc Light mission from Andersen AFB, beginning a long surge in bomber and tanker traffic around Guam. |
| Oct 4, 1965, 1537Z | First occurrence. Andersen’s FAA surveillance radar operators first note an unidentified beacon return. (NICAP’s file name and index give “27 Oct 1965”; that date appears to be a misreading of the record card’s “Oct 65 – 27 June 66.”) |
| Nov 6 & Nov 10, 1965 | Two further occurrences (1054Z and 2027Z). |
| Dec 24, 1965 | One occurrence (1005Z). |
| Mar 20, 1966 | One occurrence (1020Z). |
| Apr 5, 27 & 28, 1966 | Three occurrences (1321Z, 1257Z, 1420Z). NICAP’s sighting index lists the 5 and 27 April dates. |
| Jun 1–22, 1966 | The frequency rises sharply: fourteen occurrences from 1 to 22 June. From 7 June the FPS-6 height-finder “confirmed surveillance radar on all seven occasions that it could be made operational on time.” On 19 June at 1433Z a return “appeared to originate from a surface vessel,” became stationary and was joined by a second beacon. This is the only time multiple returns were seen. |
| Jun 23, 1966, 0800Z (6 p.m. local) | Intercept attempt by a KC-135 and a C-97. The KC-135 was at 15,000 ft in the clear with the beacon at 20,000 ft, and saw nothing. The C-97, flying VFR at 4,600 ft, the altitude then measured for the return, “passed directly over it or into it twice without visual contact.” (The report’s own list gives this occurrence as 23/0732Z.) |
| Jun 27, 1966, 1445Z (12:45 a.m. local, Jun 28) | The C-130 intercept. Air Rescue Squadron C-130 “Pile 75,” flown by Capt. Joe Kraupka and Capt. Pete Gleeson, holds the return on its APS-59 radar for twenty minutes at about 2,000 ft, with vectors from the FPS-20 controller and a return on the FPS-6. The crew fly through the return repeatedly and see nothing but cloud. Both FAA and airborne radar lose the target at the same moment, 1515Z, 56 NM northwest of Andersen. |
| Jul 11, 1966 | The 3rd Air Division (Col. Charles L. Lowell, Director of Intelligence; report prepared by Lt. Col. Howard R. Schroeder) sends a six-part message, “FAA Radar Phenomenon (UFO),” to ADC, AFSC, CSAF and OSAF: “at present are unable to explain this phenomenon.” |
| Jul 27, 1966 | The Foreign Technology Division asks its electronics staff (Mr. Bryant) for a “comprehensive analysis as to the probable cause of the radar returns.” The request is coordinated by Maj. Hector Quintanilla of Project Blue Book. |
| Aug 10 & 19, 1966 | Col. Jerome J. Jones of the FTD Electronics Directorate reports that “material (solid) targets are not involved” and proposes multiple-time-around returns and ducting. On 19 August FTD forwards the analysis to the 3rd Air Division. Blue Book’s record card closes the series as “Other (FALSE TARGETS).” |
| 2010 | NICAP researcher Daniel Wilson posts the eleven Blue Book pages (originally on footnote.com, now Fold3) to the RADCAT list. NICAP later hosts them as a single PDF and gives the 28 June case a preliminary RADCAT rating of 5. |
The Nine-Month Series, October 1965 – June 1966
The source for almost everything known about this series is a six-page message from the 3rd Air Division at Andersen, “FAA Radar Phenomenon (UFO),” reference DI 00827, dated 11 July 1966. It opens: “Radar beacon returns with no known or identifiable source have been noted by the Guam FAA controllers, using FPS-20 surveillance radar, since Oct 1965. Information was too sketchy for reporting until the month of June, when the frequency of radar sightings increased rapidly.” The message then gives a preliminary analysis. Three quarters of the occurrences were at night, and the average time on scope was about ten minutes, with a maximum of thirty. All displayed as “beacon IFF mode three with various codes, no correlation to course,” and one third also showed intermittent skin paint. Over half were first detected within 10 NM of a point 350°/33 NM from Andersen. In most cases the closest approach was 25 NM north of Guam, and only one return crossed the north coast. All but two left on northwesterly tracks, three quarters on a heading of 310° ±10°, and they usually faded 50–70 miles northwest of the base. Twenty ground-speed readings ran from about 40 to 500 knots, 85% of them under 250 knots. Five altitude readings ran from 1,000 to 20,000 ft.
The witnesses are named. The message says that “practically all of the FAA controllers have witnessed this phenomena” and recommends Wilfrid F. Gehrkin, a 53-year-old supervisory air traffic control specialist at Guam CERAP, “as the most qualified observer.” It adds that “all FAA observers are considered highly qualified and reliable.” It also records what was ruled out: no balloon releases, no other known traffic, no physical evidence, and weather “not considered as a factor due to radar beacon returns.” The Soviet trawler Izmeritel, then off Guam, is noted as the “only other unusual activity or condition.”
The 24 and the 27
NICAP’s directory page gives two figures: “24 radar sightings,” and a monthly breakdown of Oct (1), Nov (2), Dec (1), Mar (1), Apr (3) and Jun (19), which adds up to 27. An earlier version of this page left the difference unresolved. The original message resolves it. Its Part I summary gives the monthly figures, including “Jun 66 (nineteen).” Part V then lists every occurrence by date and Zulu time: 04/1537 Oct 65; 06/1054 and 10/2027 Nov 65; 24/1005 Dec 65; 20/1020 Mar 66; 05/1321, 27/1257 and 28/1420 Apr 66; and in June 01/1538, 02/1530, 03/1508, 07/0856, 07/1154, 11/0905, 12/0207, 13/0057, 13/1812, 18/1657, 19/1406, 19/1433, 19/1439, 22/1424, 23/0732 and 27/1445. That list has 24 entries, 16 of them in June. NICAP’s “24” matches the dated list; the “nineteen” for June is the message’s own summary figure, which may include occurrences the list leaves out. The dated list is the more specific record, and this page uses it.
The 24 Dated Occurrences
The table below gives the times exactly as listed in Part V of the 3rd Air Division message, in Zulu (UTC), alongside Guam local time (UTC+10, computed for this page). Converted to local time, the pattern the message describes is visible: most occurrences fall in the evening or the hours after midnight, “only two occurrences were in mid-day, one at early morning and three late day. All others were at night.” The clustering in June is also clear. There were three in the early hours of 2, 3 and 4 June (local), and three within 33 minutes just after midnight on 20 June, when the only multiple return in the record was seen.
| # | Listed time (Zulu) | Guam local time (computed) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 4 Oct 1965, 1537Z | 5 Oct 1965, 01:37 |
| 2 | 6 Nov 1965, 1054Z | 6 Nov 1965, 20:54 |
| 3 | 10 Nov 1965, 2027Z | 11 Nov 1965, 06:27 |
| 4 | 24 Dec 1965, 1005Z | 24 Dec 1965, 20:05 |
| 5 | 20 Mar 1966, 1020Z | 20 Mar 1966, 20:20 |
| 6 | 5 Apr 1966, 1321Z | 5 Apr 1966, 23:21 |
| 7 | 27 Apr 1966, 1257Z | 27 Apr 1966, 22:57 |
| 8 | 28 Apr 1966, 1420Z | 29 Apr 1966, 00:20 |
| 9 | 1 Jun 1966, 1538Z | 2 Jun 1966, 01:38 |
| 10 | 2 Jun 1966, 1530Z | 3 Jun 1966, 01:30 |
| 11 | 3 Jun 1966, 1508Z | 4 Jun 1966, 01:08 |
| 12 | 7 Jun 1966, 0856Z | 7 Jun 1966, 18:56 |
| 13 | 7 Jun 1966, 1154Z | 7 Jun 1966, 21:54 |
| 14 | 11 Jun 1966, 0905Z | 11 Jun 1966, 19:05 |
| 15 | 12 Jun 1966, 0207Z | 12 Jun 1966, 12:07 |
| 16 | 13 Jun 1966, 0057Z | 13 Jun 1966, 10:57 |
| 17 | 13 Jun 1966, 1812Z | 14 Jun 1966, 04:12 |
| 18 | 18 Jun 1966, 1657Z | 19 Jun 1966, 02:57 |
| 19 | 19 Jun 1966, 1406Z | 20 Jun 1966, 00:06 |
| 20 | 19 Jun 1966, 1433Z | 20 Jun 1966, 00:33 |
| 21 | 19 Jun 1966, 1439Z | 20 Jun 1966, 00:39 |
| 22 | 22 Jun 1966, 1424Z | 23 Jun 1966, 00:24 |
| 23 | 23 Jun 1966, 0732Z | 23 Jun 1966, 17:32 |
| 24 | 27 Jun 1966, 1445Z | 28 Jun 1966, 00:45 |
Two entries need comment. The 23 June entry is listed at 0732Z, while the intercept by the KC-135 and C-97 is given in Part III as 0800Z, so the aircraft were sent after a return already on the scope. The 27 June entry at 1445Z is the C-130 intercept, which ran past midnight local time into 28 June. That is why the event is usually dated 28 June, and why the record card gives the series as ending on “27 June 66.”
The June 1966 Intercepts
The air division tried to put aircraft on the returns. At 0800Z on 23 June (6 p.m. local), a KC-135 and a C-97 were sent after one. The KC-135, at 15,000 ft in the clear, made no sighting of a beacon return at 20,000 ft. The C-97 was flying visually at 4,600 ft, “same altitude as measured at that time for the beacon phenomenon,” and “passed directly over it or into it twice without visual contact.” The FTD analysis later reasoned from this kind of result: “since interceptors have flown over and/or through the targets without any visual sighting or other evidence of the presence of material objects,” any material object causing the returns must be somewhere other than where the radar showed it.
The report calls the next attempt “the most significant to date.” At 1445Z on 27 June (12:45 a.m. local on 28 June), an Andersen Air Rescue Squadron C-130, call sign Pile 75, took off with an APS-59 search radar. Its pilots, Capt. Joe Kraupka and Capt. Pete Gleeson, are described as “very reliable and objective observers.” Contact was held for twenty minutes at about 2,000 ft, and “numerous intercepts were attempted.” It was “a clear moonlit night with scattered cumulus at flight level which was too thin to paint on the radar.” The crew’s observations were these. They used “pencil beam” on the APS-59 for accurate homing. Maximum contact range was 6 NM. The return was “a narrow series of dots such as an electrical impulse would give,” about one nautical mile long on the scope and “always oriented in line with the center of the radar scope.” Vectors from the ground controller “checked perfectly” with the airborne return, and the FPS-6 height-finder “also was in operation and had the return.” The crew “homed in on and flew through the return repeatedly with no visual contact”: “there seemed to be a cloud associated with the target at all times, and never the same cloud. Whenever they tried to spot it visually it was always in a cloud.” At 1515Z the target was lost to FAA and airborne radar at the same time, 322°/56 NM from Andersen. The message’s own summary of the event reads: “No visual sightings have been made except the reported cloud on 27 Jun. Target appears to be of an electrical nature only.”
Two details of the C-130 report matter for any explanation. A return drawn as a line of dots, a mile long and always pointing at the scope centre, is how a transponder reply or other pulsed signal looks on a radar display, rather than the compact echo of an object. And the crew flew through the position repeatedly without meeting anything. NICAP later gave the 28 June case a “Category 9, RADAR — Preliminary Rating: 5” in its RADCAT directory, the top of its 1–5 strangeness scale. That rating is marked preliminary, and NICAP’s own directory page shows only the summary data, not the FTD analysis or the record card’s conclusion.
The Air Force Analysis and Disposition
On 27 July 1966, Col. Louis DeGoes of the Foreign Technology Division sent the air division’s message to the FTD electronics staff. He asked for a “comprehensive analysis as to the probable cause of the radar returns as soon as possible,” and Maj. Hector Quintanilla, head of Project Blue Book, coordinated the request. The reply, signed by Col. Jerome J. Jones of the Electronics Directorate on 10 August, began by saying that the data “does not lend itself to analysis of individual tracks.” It then set out its reasoning. Because interceptors had flown through the targets and found nothing, any material objects causing the returns had to be elsewhere. And “the fact that coded IFF returns are received eliminates many of the usual causes for false returns, and almost certainly indicate the target is IFF equipped.” Under some conditions, it added, maintenance shops testing equipment or deliberate spoofing could emit such signals, “but these are not considered likely.”
The analysis offered a mechanism: multiple-range returns, “second-, third-, or fourth-time-around returns.” These were feasible because a transponder reply is a one-way transmission, not a two-way echo, so it can be received from aircraft far beyond the radar’s normal range and be shown at a false, shorter range. The occasional skin paint, it suggested, could be a real aircraft’s broadside echo, which could be detectable well beyond normal range. The simultaneous loss of the target on several radars, and speeds not usual for aircraft, “could be due to ducting,” to a change in the atmosphere, or to the aircraft flying out of the duct. On the Soviet trawler, the analysis said that if the signals came from the trawler “it would be easy to DF on the source,” and that triggering airborne IFFs from the trawler would not produce returns that synchronised across several radars. It concluded: “Since it is obvious that material (solid) targets are not involved, we have tried to reason out how the conditions could happen.”
FTD sent the analysis to the 3rd Air Division on 19 August 1966 over the signature of Col. Warren S. Wheeler. Blue Book’s Project 10073 record card for “Oct 65 – 27 June 66, Andersen AFB, Guam” (source: military; type: ground-radar; photos: no; physical evidence: no) gives the conclusion “Other (FALSE TARGETS).” Its summary reads: “Radar beacon returns with no known or identifiable source have been noted since October 1965. RADAR ANALYSIS: It is obvious that material (solid) targets are not involved.” An earlier version of this page said that no Blue Book disposition had been found. That was wrong: the disposition sits on the first page of the document package the page itself cited.
The FTD analysis was reasoning, not a traced source. Nobody identified which aircraft’s transponder produced which return, and the 3rd Air Division had already said that the correlation with Arc Light traffic it first suspected “has been disproved.” What the record does show is that the phenomenon consisted of coded IFF replies, which require a transponder somewhere. It showed up best on the ground radar. And aircraft sent to its displayed position found nothing there on three attempts.
Key Witnesses
Capt. Joe Kraupka and Capt. Pete Gleeson
Named in Part IV of the 3rd Air Division message as the pilots of the C-130 that held the return on its APS-59 radar for twenty minutes, and described there as “very reliable and objective observers.” Their reported observations are summarised above: the dotted, radially aligned return, the repeated fly-throughs, and the cloud that was “never the same cloud.” No later interview with either man was found. The names are as typed in the message.
Wilfrid F. Gehrkin
Aged 53 in July 1966, and recommended in the air division’s report “as the most qualified observer” among the FAA controllers, “practically all” of whom had seen the returns on the FPS-20. The controllers first noticed the returns in October 1965 and gave the vectors that “checked perfectly” with the C-130’s radar on 27/28 June. No other statement by Gehrkin was found.
Lt. Col. Howard R. Schroeder and Col. Charles L. Lowell
Schroeder, chief of the Combat Intelligence Division, prepared the July 1966 report, and Lowell, the Director of Intelligence, released it. Their conclusion was that the investigation was continuing but they were “at present … unable to explain this phenomenon.” On the Air Force side, the analysis was written by Col. Jerome J. Jones (FTD Electronics Directorate) and coordinated by Maj. Hector Quintanilla.
The Five Observables Assessment
Low Observability is rated Speculative. No object was seen, even when a C-97 and a C-130 flew through the displayed position. On the record, though, that points less to a hidden craft than to the return not marking where anything was: FTD concluded that solid targets were not involved. Instant Acceleration and Hypersonic Velocity are Absent. The twenty ground-speed readings ran from about 40 to 500 knots, 85% of them under 250 knots, which is within aircraft performance. Anti-Gravity Lift is Speculative only within this site’s comparative framework, and no source makes that claim. Trans-Medium is Speculative only because of the crew’s remark that the target always seemed to be in a cloud, a remark the report itself treats as atmospheric.
Evidence Assessment
Supporting Genuine Anomaly
- The 3rd Air Division, with named, experienced FAA controllers as witnesses, could not explain the returns and ruled out balloons, other known traffic and weather
- On 27/28 June the FPS-20 vectors “checked perfectly” with the C-130’s APS-59 return, the FPS-6 also had it, and FAA and airborne radar lost it at the same time
- The source of the coded IFF replies was never identified; FTD offered a mechanism, not a traced aircraft
- 24 dated occurrences over nine months, with consistent geometry (first detected about 33 NM north, exiting on a heading of about 310°)
Supporting Conventional Origin
- Every occurrence was a coded IFF Mode 3 transponder reply, a signal that requires a transponder; the FTD analysts took this as evidence that the source was IFF-equipped
- The C-130’s return was “a narrow series of dots such as an electrical impulse would give,” always aligned with the scope centre, and the air division itself concluded the target “appears to be of an electrical nature only”
- Three intercept attempts (KC-135, C-97, C-130) flew over or through the displayed position and found nothing material
- The FTD Electronics Directorate concluded that “material (solid) targets are not involved” and proposed multiple-time-around returns and ducting
- Project Blue Book closed the series as “Other (FALSE TARGETS)”
Why "Disputed"
The documents are genuine, detailed and internally consistent, and the witnesses are named professionals. The case is not a hoax or a misremembered story. But what the record documents is a radar-display phenomenon, not an object. Every return was a coded transponder reply. No aircraft sent to the displayed position found anything there. The Air Force’s electronics analysts said plainly that no solid target was involved, and Blue Book filed the series as false targets. Weighing against that, the source of the replies was never traced, and the explanation offered was a plausible mechanism rather than a demonstrated one. The 3rd Air Division, closest to the data, could not explain it. Taken together, the series is a well-documented radar anomaly with an official false-target disposition. It is not evidence of an unknown craft.
What is not in question: Guam FAA controllers recorded 24 dated occurrences of unidentified IFF beacon returns between 4 October 1965 and 27 June 1966; the Air Force flew three intercept attempts against them; and the C-130 held one for twenty minutes on two radars plus a height-finder. What remains open is whose transponder was replying, and why it appeared where nothing was.
Sensor & Instrumentation Detection Profile
The radar data are the whole case, and they need to be read for what they are. Three sets are named in the record, and the most important fact is the kind of return they displayed.
Primary Echoes and Secondary (Beacon) Returns
The distinction that decides this case is between primary and secondary radar. A primary radar transmits a pulse and listens for its echo off whatever is there: an aircraft, a flock of birds, a rain cell, terrain bent into view by refraction. This is what radar operators call a “skin paint.” A secondary radar system, which military services call IFF (identification friend or foe) and which also carried the SIF (selective identification feature) codes, works differently. The ground interrogator sends a coded challenge, and an aircraft’s transponder answers with a coded reply. That reply is displayed as a beacon return carrying the aircraft’s code. Mode 3 was the military mode that later became the civil Mode A, used by air traffic control to identify individual aircraft.
Secondary returns have three properties that matter here. First, they exist only if a transponder is replying, so they cannot come from weather, birds or ordinary clutter. Second, the reply is a transmission, not an echo, so it is far stronger at long range than a primary echo and can be received from aircraft well beyond the radar’s nominal coverage. Third, the display places a reply at a range worked out from the time since the last interrogation. If a reply belongs to an earlier interrogation, or reaches the receiver by an unusual atmospheric path, it is drawn at the wrong place. Engineers call the first effect “second-time-around” (or multiple-time-around), and the general family of such problems is known as secondary-radar “fruit” and false targets. These are the effects the FTD analysts invoked. The 3rd Air Division’s statement that every return displayed “as beacon IFF mode three with various codes” is the single most important line in the file.
AN/FPS-20 — Ground Surveillance Radar
The AN/FPS-20 was a long-range L-band search radar, deployed widely in the 1950s, and many were later used for joint Air Force/FAA surveillance. At Guam it was worked by FAA controllers, and it was used “in all cases” in this series. Its interrogator triggered aircraft IFF/SIF transponders, whose coded replies appeared on the controllers’ displays as beacon returns. It was those coded replies, “beacon IFF mode three with various codes,” that the controllers could not match to any known aircraft.
AN/FPS-6 — Height-Finding Radar
The AN/FPS-6 was a General Electric S-band height-finding radar, widely used by the U.S. Air Force from the 1950s. According to the report, it was used “when available.” From 7 June 1966 it “confirmed surveillance radar on all seven occasions that it could be made operational on time,” and it “had the return” during the C-130 intercept. The five altitude readings in the report (1,000 to 20,000 ft) presumably come from it, though the report does not say so.
AN/APS-59 — Airborne Search Radar
The AN/APS-59, carried by the Air Rescue Squadron C-130, was the only airborne radar to detect the phenomenon: “airborne radar contact only one date, 27 Jun 66.” Using its “pencil beam” mode, the crew held contact for twenty minutes, at a maximum range of 6 NM. The shape of the return, a mile-long line of dots radially aligned with the scope centre, is the most telling detail in the file. The crew could home on it, but there was nothing to find when they got there.
Beacon Returns, Skin Paint and the Absence of Any Visual Object
An earlier version of this page treated the “radar beacon returns” as a minor side anomaly, separate from a primary target. The record shows the opposite: beacon returns were the phenomenon. All occurrences displayed as Mode 3 IFF codes, and only a third also showed intermittent skin paint (a primary echo). The FTD analysts accounted for the skin paint as possibly a real aircraft’s large broadside echo detected at long range. No optical, photographic or visual confirmation exists for any occurrence. The only visual report is the C-130 crew’s cloud.
Environmental & Geospatial Context
Guam lies in the tropical western Pacific. Its drier season runs roughly January to June and its wet season roughly July to November. The report gives the weather for the C-130 intercept: “a clear moonlit night with scattered cumulus at flight level which was too thin to paint on the radar.” A JPL Horizons ephemeris computed for this page puts the Moon about 72% illuminated (waxing gibbous) and in the west-southwest at the time. It stood about 22° above the horizon at 1445Z, sinking to about 8° by 1515Z. The air division judged weather “typical for this area and not a factor with radar beacon returns,” since weather cannot generate coded transponder replies. FTD, however, invoked atmospheric ducting to explain the ranges, speeds and simultaneous losses.
The geometry is consistent. Most returns were first detected within 10 NM of a point 33 NM north of Andersen. They usually came no closer than 25 NM north of the island, and left to the northwest, toward the Philippine Sea. That is the direction of the main air routes and of Arc Light traffic toward Southeast Asia, although the air division said a correlation with Arc Light launches and recoveries had been disproved.
Observer Credibility & Occupational Profile
The observers were professionals. The air division described the FAA controllers as “highly qualified and reliable,” and named the C-130 pilots as “very reliable and objective observers.” There is no reason to doubt that they saw what they reported. The question in this case is not their honesty or skill but what their instruments were showing. A controller can report a coded reply exactly and still have no way of knowing, from the display alone, whether the transponder is where the display puts it.
An earlier version of this page said that no individual witness was named anywhere in the record. That was wrong. The July 1966 message names the C-130 pilots, Capt. Joe Kraupka and Capt. Pete Gleeson; the FAA supervisor, Wilfrid F. Gehrkin; and the preparing officer, Lt. Col. Howard R. Schroeder. No later interviews with any of them were found.
Physical & Material Assays
No physical debris, trace evidence or material sample was recovered from any of the 24 occurrences, and the air division’s report states that “no physical evidence exists.” Every occurrence is a radar event.
Historical Precedents & Archive Matches
This wave's most direct precedent sits at the same installation: this site's separate Andersen Air Force Base UFO Sightings case file documents a smaller, purely visual 1952–1959 cluster at the same base, thirteen years before this wave's opening contact. The contrast between the two is itself analytically interesting — the same installation producing two genuinely separate, well-documented UAP clusters a decade apart, the first entirely visual with no instrumented data, the second entirely instrumented with no visual confirmation, almost inverse evidentiary profiles from the same runway. A third, smaller and unrelated data point — the September 25, 1961 Pilecki sighting discussed in Background above — sits chronologically between the two larger clusters without meaningfully connecting to either.
Beyond Andersen AFB itself, this wave's evidentiary shape (multiple independent ground and airborne radar systems corroborating an unidentified target, intercepts attempted by military aircraft, no definitive visual resolution) most closely resembles this site's Lakenheath–Bentwaters Radar-Visual Incident (1956, Suffolk, England), in which four radar systems tracked violently maneuvering targets and an RAF night-fighter's own radar lock produced an anomalous result — though Lakenheath-Bentwaters also achieved a degree of visual and airborne-intercept-radar correlation this Andersen wave never did. It bears a looser resemblance to the RB-47 Bomber Chase (1957, Gulf Coast, USA), which combined visual, ground radar, and airborne ELINT tracking of a single pursuit rather than a sustained multi-month wave, and to the Kinross Incident (1953, Michigan/Lake Superior), another case built primarily on a radar target's behavior rather than eyewitness testimony. None of these comparisons should be read as claiming the cases share a common cause — only that they occupy a similar evidentiary category (military radar-corroborated, visually unconfirmed or only partially confirmed) that this site tracks across cases specifically because that category behaves differently, evidentially, than the far more common single-witness visual sighting.
Material Analysis
No material was recovered, so this section looks instead at what the radar returns physically were, as far as the record allows.
Coded Replies and Multi-Radar Agreement
Agreement between the FPS-20, the FPS-6 and the C-130’s APS-59 on 27/28 June is real, and it rules out a fault in any one set. It does not show that an object was present. Any real signal source, or any real atmospheric condition, would appear on every set looking at it. A transponder reply has a special property: it is transmitted once, not reflected, so it can be received from much farther away than a radar echo. If it arrives after the radar’s next pulse, it is drawn at a false, short range. This “multiple-time-around” effect was the core of the FTD explanation. The simultaneous loss of contact at 1515Z, which an earlier version of this page counted as anomalous, was one of the points the FTD analysts addressed directly. They attributed it to ducting, a change in the atmosphere, or the responsible aircraft flying out of the duct.
The “Cloud”
The crew’s report that “there seemed to be a cloud associated with the target at all times, and never the same cloud” is consistent with the weather they described: a moonlit night with thin scattered cumulus at their flight level. If the return marked no physical object, the crew would always find themselves looking at whatever lay at the indicated position, and on that night that was usually a patch of cloud. The record does not support reading the cloud as something the target produced.
Supporting Non-Terrestrial or Unconventional Origin
- The coded replies were never traced to any aircraft, ship or ground source
- Three radars agreed on 27/28 June, and FAA and airborne radar lost the return at the same moment
- The 3rd Air Division ruled out balloons, other known traffic and weather, and could not explain the returns
Supporting Terrestrial or Conventional Origin
- All returns were coded IFF Mode 3 replies, which implies a transponder; FTD judged the source “IFF equipped”
- Three intercepting aircraft passed over or through the indicated positions and found nothing
- FTD concluded that “material (solid) targets are not involved,” and Blue Book closed the series as “Other (FALSE TARGETS)”
The Conventional Explanation Candidate
Unusually for a radar case, the Air Force wrote down a specific explanation, so this section begins there. It then weighs the alternatives.
Multiple-Time-Around Transponder Replies with Ducting (the FTD explanation)
The FTD Electronics Directorate’s explanation runs as follows. The coded Mode 3 replies came from real IFF-equipped aircraft that the Guam radar was interrogating at long range. Because a transponder reply travels one way, it can be received far beyond normal radar range and shown as a second-, third- or fourth-time-around return at a false, shorter range. Occasional skin paint could come from the large broadside echo of a real aircraft. Atmospheric ducting would account for odd speeds, hovering, and the simultaneous loss of a return on several radars. The theory fits the strongest facts in the record. The returns were coded IFF replies. Aircraft flown to the displayed positions found nothing. The C-130’s return looked like a pulsed signal and lay along the radius of its scope. And most returns left toward the northwest, along the main traffic direction.
The weakness of the theory is that it was not tested against specific flights. FTD said the data “does not lend itself to analysis of individual tracks,” and the air division had earlier found that the returns did not correlate with Arc Light launches and recoveries. The explanation is therefore a well-reasoned mechanism from the people best placed to judge it, and Blue Book adopted it. It is not a demonstrated identification of the source.
Weather Echoes and Precipitation Clutter
Weather can produce primary radar echoes, but it cannot produce coded IFF replies. The air division ruled weather out for that reason, and the C-130 crew reported cloud too thin to paint on radar. Weather therefore plays a role only through ducting, which is part of the FTD explanation, not a separate one. An earlier version of this page treated precipitation clutter as a serious candidate and linked the June peak to Guam’s seasonal rains. The record does not support either point.
Spoofing, Test Equipment or the Soviet Trawler
FTD considered the idea that maintenance shops testing equipment, or “some activity engaged in spoofing,” could emit such signals, and called it not likely. It specifically considered the Soviet trawler Izmeritel, then on station off Guam. It argued that a trawler source would be easy to direction-find, and that triggering airborne IFFs from the trawler would not produce returns synchronised across several radars. The 19 June occurrence, when a return “appeared to originate from a surface vessel,” is the one observation in the file that points this way. The record does not say whether it was followed up.
Equipment Fault
A fault in a single radar set cannot account for the 27/28 June event, which was seen by the FPS-20, the FPS-6 and the C-130’s APS-59. A fault in the interrogation or display chain might account for some of the earlier ground-only occurrences, but no source proposes one, and FTD did not consider it the likely cause.
Genuine Anomaly
The source of the replies was never traced, and the air division that collected the data could not explain them. But an unknown craft would not normally answer IFF interrogations with Mode 3 codes, and aircraft sent to the indicated positions found nothing there. Nothing in the record requires an anomalous explanation.
The Assessment
Multiple-Time-Around IFF Replies / Ducting
Highly PlausibleThe Air Force’s own analysis and the basis of Blue Book’s “false targets” disposition. It fits the coded replies, the empty intercepts and the shape of the C-130 return, but it was never tied to specific flights.
Weather Echoes / Precipitation
UnlikelyWeather cannot generate coded transponder replies, and the cloud on the intercept night was too thin to paint. It enters the picture only through ducting.
Spoofing / Test Equipment / Soviet Trawler
UnlikelyConsidered and judged not likely by FTD. The 19 June “surface vessel” observation is the only point in its favour.
Equipment Fault
UnlikelyRuled out for the multi-radar event of 27/28 June; not proposed by any source for the others.
Genuine Anomaly
UnlikelyThe source was never traced, but the phenomenon consisted of coded IFF replies, and the positions they indicated were empty.
Related Cases
Confirmed Documents & Official Records
NICAP’s RADCAT directory entry for the 28 June 1966 event (Category 9, Radar; Preliminary Rating 5). It summarises the 3rd Air Division message, including the “24 radar sightings” figure and the 19-in-June monthly breakdown, but does not mention the FTD analysis or Blue Book’s “false targets” conclusion.
UNCLASSIFIED (declassified Blue Book file)Daniel Wilson’s 21 April 2010 RADCAT post listing the eleven Blue Book pages for this case: the Project 10073 record, the FTD letters, the 3rd Air Division message, and others. The original footnote.com links no longer resolve; NICAP hosts the same pages as one PDF (next entry).
UNCLASSIFIED (declassified Blue Book file)The primary source for this page, read in full for the October 2026 review. It contains: the Project 10073 record card (“Other (FALSE TARGETS)”); FTD’s cover letter to the 3rd Air Division (19 Aug 1966); the FTD Electronics Directorate analysis by Col. Jerome J. Jones (10 Aug 1966); Col. DeGoes’s request for analysis (27 Jul 1966); and the six-page 3rd Air Division message DI 00827 (11 Jul 1966). NICAP’s file name (“651027”) does not correspond to any date in the documents.
UNCLASSIFIED (declassified Blue Book file)NICAP’s sighting index lists “Anderson AFB” entries for 1965-10-27, 1966-04-05, 1966-04-27 and 1966-06-28. The April dates match the Blue Book list. The October date does not: the list’s first occurrence is 4 October 1965.
UNCLASSIFIED (independent research archive)A separate, earlier Blue Book case: two brief sightings on 25 September 1961, one reported by Air Intelligence Officer Capt. Edward J. Pilecki about 25 miles north of Anatahan Island, filed as “MAY BE METEOR.” Unrelated to the 1965–66 radar returns.
UNCLASSIFIED (declassified Blue Book file)National Archives holdings of Project Blue Book's full case files and administrative records (94 microfilm rolls), the ultimate primary-source archive underlying NICAP's own digitized case summaries for this wave.
UNCLASSIFIED (declassified)Search Government Archives Directly
Further Reading — Recommended Literature
The UFO Encyclopedia, 4th Ed.
The definitive general reference on UFO cases and history, including extensive coverage of Project Blue Book's radar-case investigative methods and rating conventions that this case file draws on directly.
UFOs and the National Security State
A chronological account of the American military and intelligence community's UFO reporting infrastructure, covering exactly the 1965–66 Vietnam-War-era period this case's Arc Light background is set within.
Clear Intent: The Government Coverup of the UFO Experience
A detailed examination of declassified military and government UFO files, with particular attention to radar-tracked and multi-sensor military cases of exactly this case file's evidentiary type.
The UFO Evidence
NICAP's own foundational compilation of its strongest documented cases, sent to every member of Congress in 1964 — the same research organization and analytical tradition that catalogued and rated this wave two years later.
DISCLOSURE: Some links above are affiliate links. If you purchase through them, OverClassified receives a small commission at no additional cost to you. This helps support independent research.
Essential Viewing
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Sources
- NICAP. UFO Report: Anderson AFB, Guam, June 28, 1966 — Air Intercept & Radar Tracks (case directory). nicap.org
- NICAP / Daniel Wilson. Full report and scanned Project Blue Book document index, June 28, 1966. nicap.org
- U.S. Air Force, Project Blue Book file, Andersen AFB, Guam, Oct 1965 – Jun 1966 (11 pages): Project 10073 record card; 3rd Air Division message DI 00827, “FAA Radar Phenomenon (UFO),” 11 Jul 1966; Col. L. DeGoes to Mr. Bryant, 27 Jul 1966; Col. J. J. Jones, FTD Electronics Directorate, “FAA Radar Phenomenon,” 10 Aug 1966; Col. W. S. Wheeler to 3rd Air Division, 19 Aug 1966. Scans hosted by NICAP. nicap.org
- NICAP. National Sighting Index Database (NSID), "Listing by City" — entries for Anderson AFB, Guam, 1965–66. nicap.org
- NICAP. Explanation of NICAP's Category/Rating/Reliability case-classification system. nicap.org
- UFOScans.com. "Project 10073 Record Card and Incoming Staff Message: UFO Sightings at Andersen AFB, Guam" (September 25, 1961 — separate, earlier incident). ufoscans.com
- National Archives (NARA). Project Blue Book records and UFO investigation summary. archives.gov
- OverClassified. The Andersen Air Force Base UFO Sightings (1952–1959 cluster at the same base). overclassified.org
- "AN/FPS-20 Early Warning Radar." Wikipedia — consulted for radar system specifications, manufacturer, and service history. en.wikipedia.org
- "AN/FPS-6 Radar." Wikipedia — consulted for radar system specifications, manufacturer, and service history. en.wikipedia.org
- "Lockheed C-130 Hercules." Wikipedia — consulted for aircraft background and 1960s service role. en.wikipedia.org
- "Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker." Wikipedia — consulted for aircraft background and 1960s service role. en.wikipedia.org
- "Boeing C-97 Stratofreighter." Wikipedia — consulted for aircraft background and mid-1960s service role. en.wikipedia.org
- "Operation Arc Light." Wikipedia — consulted for the June 1965 B-52 deployment to Andersen AFB and its air-traffic implications for this case's background. en.wikipedia.org
- "Project Blue Book." Wikipedia — consulted for program history, case categorization, and 1969 closure. en.wikipedia.org
- "Andersen Air Force Base." Wikipedia — consulted for base history and geographic coordinates. en.wikipedia.org
- Wikimedia Commons. "AN-FPS-20 Radar.jpg," U.S. Air Force official photograph, public domain (via David F. Winkler, Searching the Skies, 1997). commons.wikimedia.org
- Winkler, David F. Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program (1997) — source of the hero image's original attribution.
- NICAP. UFO Casebook 1965 (consulted to confirm no separate public casebook entry exists for the October 1965 Andersen AFB contact beyond the NSID/PDF record). nicap.org
- NICAP. UFO Casebook 1966 (consulted to confirm no separate public casebook entries exist for the April 1966 Andersen AFB contacts beyond the NSID/PDF record). nicap.org
- JPL Horizons ephemeris for the Moon from Andersen AFB, 27 June 1966, 14:00–16:00 UT (computed for this page). ssd.jpl.nasa.gov
Corrections (October 2026)
This page was checked in October 2026 against the eleven-page Project Blue Book document package that NICAP hosts. The page had cited that package before but described it as unreadable. It was read in full for this review, together with NICAP’s directory entry and Daniel Wilson’s 2010 post. The earlier version said that no Blue Book disposition existed. In fact the record card concludes “Other (FALSE TARGETS),” and FTD’s analysis states that “material (solid) targets are not involved.” The earlier version also said that no witnesses were named; the July 1966 message names the C-130 pilots, Capt. Joe Kraupka and Capt. Pete Gleeson, the FAA supervisor Wilfrid F. Gehrkin, and the preparing officer, Lt. Col. Howard R. Schroeder. It treated the “radar beacon returns” as a side anomaly separate from a primary target, when every occurrence was a coded IFF Mode 3 reply. It said the weather for the intercept night was unknown and leaned on a precipitation and seasonal-rain explanation, when the message describes a clear moonlit night with thin cumulus and rules weather out.
Following this review, the rating was changed from Credible 70 to Disputed 35 (October 27, 2026), because the higher rating had rested partly on claims corrected or removed above.
Detail. First occurrence: 4 October 1965, not 27 October; the 27 October date in NICAP’s index appears to come from a misreading of the record card. The 24-versus-27 discrepancy is resolved: the message’s dated list has 24 entries (16 in June), while its summary gives 19 for June. The C-130 intercept began at 1445Z on 27 June, i.e. 12:45 a.m. local on 28 June; it was at about 2,000 ft, with a maximum range of 6 NM, and was lost 56 NM northwest of Andersen. The 23 June intercept took place at 0800Z (6 p.m. local); the C-97 passed over or into the return twice. Added: the occurrence statistics (speeds, altitudes, headings, times on scope); the Soviet trawler Izmeritel; the 19 June “surface vessel” return; the FTD reasoning; and the disproved Arc Light correlation. Removed: the claim that the APS-59 was “originally developed for the B-52’s own airborne-alert and reconnaissance mission” (no source); radar production figures from Wikipedia; the description of Arc Light as “one of the largest sustained air-traffic surges” of the Cold War; and the claim that June falls at the start of Guam’s wet season as evidence for weather clutter. Corrected: the subtitle’s “nine years after” the 1952–1959 cluster (it was six). The computed lunar illumination of “5%” and the “light drizzle” reanalysis weather were generated for 27 October 1965, not for the intercept night; they have been replaced with a Horizons computation (about 72%) and the weather recorded in the message.
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